Abstract
Across various cultural and political contexts, Islam—as both a faith and socio-political identity has been subject to recurring scrutiny due to acts of terrorism perpetrated by individuals identifying with it. This brief and cursory essay explores whether there exists a structural or theological basis within Islamic practice and belief that may contribute to this recurring pattern, whilst also considering why in-group public condemnation appears infrequent or entirely muted.
I. Introduction A Patten Of Violent Events
This month has seen several seemingly and apparently unconnected forms of Islamic violence. This week on the 22nd of April in Indian-administrated Kashmir, another vicious terror attack resulted in the deaths of at least 26 innocent people.
Victims were segregated according to gender and targeted and executed based on their inability to recite Islamic verses. This internationally evolving incident comes on the coattails of coordinated mass Islamic prison riots actioned in multiple seperate regions of France.
Days prior to all of these separate issues Hashem Abedi – the younger brother of the deceased Manchester Arena bomber Salman Abedi– committed a horrific violent assault against three prison officers. Putting them into critical condition and scarring them for life, not just mentally, but with hot oil allegedly mixed with his own urine. It is not difficult to see why people might fear the growing presence of Islam.
II. Theological Roots And Divine Mandate
To rationalise and attempt to understand this patterned radical behaviour I’m attempting to deconstruct and unearth the normative ethical force that perpetuates this pattern of violence. In other words, why do the advocates of Islam and many of their co-religionist consistently act this way and commit acts of violence and terror seemingly without apology?
Although there is no doubt a variety of theological schools of thought in Islam, I will take the perhaps naive default position that if Islam is believed to be true then a divine mandate to spread Islam is entailed as a theological categorical imperative. This means that the obligation to spread Islam is an objective and universal stance independent normative moral guide to all Muslim behaviour.
There are several verses the primary source material of the Qur’an that could support this supposition. Such as the following examples:
- “It is He who sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth to manifest it over all religion, although those who associate others with Allah dislike it.”—Surah At-Tawbah 9:33
- “And fight them until there is no more fitnah and religion is entirely for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the wrongdoers.”—Surah Al-Baqarah 2:193
- “O believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. Should you disagree on anything, then refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you truly believe in Allah and the Last Day. This is the best and fairest resolution.”—Surah An-Nisa 4:59
The final example here empathises upon the idea that any disagreement between the believers can be solved and extrapolated directly through obedience to the Qur’an itself and the messenger—in other words the solution isn’t found with finite intellectual human comprehension but rather appears and presents itself once one has fully submitted to the natural and social divine authoritarian order, an order hierarchically structured with God, the Messenger, and those with the arm of rightful authority.
We can exegete the above textual examples and summarise this purposed divine moral imperative into logical semantic structure, it might be worded thusly:
“What God has decreed as right must be pursued universally; therefore, the Muslim is bound to promote Islam and its law as a moral imperative, irrespective of personal sentiment or worldly law, for righteousness lies solely in obedience to divine command.”
These mandates to spread Islam, when logically formulated necessarily entail the establishment of Sharia law. The Sharia law is considered as the supreme divine law for ordering humanity and thereby necessarily establishing the most peaceful and flourishing society possible—a beneficial society not just for Muslims; but for all peoples of the world under their care and God’s guidance.
III. Collective Obligation and Interpretive Practice
As an objective theological categorical divine imperative, this would mean that all Muslims that ritually practice the five pillars of Islam, regardless of their zeal and their active or passive participation to achieve this idealised end goal; in one way or another work collectively towards this end out of sheer and necessary obligation. Regardless of what they personally believe or feel about the actions that may lead others in their footsteps toward this end goal.
As a theological divine mandate; it would seem the Islamic deity has a will that operates under a form of Divine Command Theory. In short this means that whatever is considered good and bad under Islamic theology is established by God. General atheistic critique applies here but is rarely directed toward Islamic apologists. If DCT is true; and if Islam is true; then God is, or rather in this case, God commands and blurs the line of Good and Evil to suit the ultimate divine purpose and intentionality for humanity.
If the divine purpose is to establish Sharia law, then regardless of human rationality or sentiment it necessarily entails that the means of getting there are all justified by this categorical divine command. An evil deed is no longer qualified by human will, rationality, approval, or disapproval, or even societal convention. Rather the deed is a one sided contract with the inferred divine purpose. Not a contract with the deity itself but with the revealed purpose of that said deity—according to which martyrdom is interpreted as scripturally sound and rewarded.
However, I think it is crucial to note that the deed cannot be anything other than an act of faith of which only God knows whether to bestow or arbitrarily withdraw reward. To do so wouldn’t be truly arbitrary but rather could be rationally and counterintuitively interpreted as His judgement and destiny for that martyred individual.
This interpreted observation of Islamic violent behaviour helps to understand the problem and post-reaction of the global Muslim community. Rarely, if ever has a Muslim apologist publicly apologised for the violence that emanates from individuals within the interpreted ethos of Islam. Rarely, if ever has a Muslim apologist ever publicly explained why the threat of violence or disruption is always imminent from within the interpretive practice of Islam.
I cannot speak for Muslims, but if all things above observations are accurate and considered fairly. It would seem that even if we take the perhaps charitable assumption that many Muslims experience revulsion of such perpetual violence—this revulsion is based on the person’s subjective finite human emotion and rationality, all of which might be considered and experienced by the believer as a counterintuitive cognitive dissonance influenced by the current imperfect social order.
IV. Epistemic Humility and the Silence of Critique
Furthermore, even with the above considered, condemning such an act would seem to presume knowledge of several unknowable factors. First the ability to per se know God’s will and by extension ipso-facto God’s ultimate purpose for the martyred person. All factors of which from Islamic paradigm only God can ultimately know. Secondly, voicing such an opinion seems contrary to the divine categorical imperative discussed above and infringes a personal judgement of another’s act of faith and God’s ultimate purpose. In summary, epistemic and devout humility prevents open and sincere discussion of this repeatedly observed phenomena.
V. Conclusion: A Natural Critique
This is an attempted detached and dispassionate analysis of a recurring global phenomena. If you’re reading this as a Muslim and feel victimised or offended this is not my intention. I want you to understand that this is the best I can sincerely do to rationalise why similar acts of violence and terror, like the one experienced in Kashmir keep happening. If this analysis is true, and if not entirely true then at least partially accurate—it follows as a natural critique of the consequences of general doctrine and interpretive Islamic practice. The Qur’an can be seen as a text of which to extrapolate divine law that nobody can possibly hold themselves to at all times without accepting the inevitability of occasional and ultimately unjustifiable violence. A violence that runs counter to and cannot be married with common and near universal moral intuitions.