Abstract
This essay was written on the weekend and throughout the week, it explores the problem of evil. It is not a systematic breakdown of the infamous problem but explores it in ways I haven’t thought about before which the reader may not have entertained. Without getting side tracked by the question of free will itself. We examine the free will defence and elaborate on the intricacies and entailments of that defence. We also explore from the shoreline different theoretical paradigms of evil. Is evil a privation of the good, or does evil have its foundation in a powerful and conscious ultimate evil being? After framing the infamous problem of evil question, and further familiarizing the subject we investigate the topic under the surface and attempt to construct a thought experiment entitled ‘The Ultimate Evil Being Theodicy’. Asking questions, such as could an ultimate evil being exist? Would such an evil being be all powerful? This leads into an elaboration of the Evil God Hypothesis with an attempted soft refutation. This essay was written with free flowing thoughts. Its skeleton structure constructed on a weekend, with the flesh and muscle fibre added to the bones mid week. It follows a logical structure and isn’t particularly written for an academic audience. It presupposes familiarity with the problem of evil objection but can be read and understood by anyone interested in the topic.
Traditional Assumptions Of The Free Will Defence
Regarding the problem of evil, it recently occurred to me that the general and typical quick fire and shoot from the hip response is that moral evil is the inevitable result that entails the double edged gift of agency free will. I think responding to the objection in this way presupposes the volitional inclination to refrain or commit ourselves to enacting evil. It assumes that some people choose the evil path or deed through action or inaction. This may be true, however it also assumes an ethereal definition of evil. The classical theistic Augustinian privation of evil without substance or essence, which wouldn’t have any foundational being or existence were it not for the volitional choice to exercise and will evil into physical existence. This may not be the only way for us to conveniently frame evil in its best and most attractive light.
Evil Frameworks, What If There Is An Ultimate Evil Being?
Evil may not be an elusive privation, evil, if it has its own tangible being with its own concerns and personified evil ends, might very well naturally approve of the privation theory and want us to disbelieve or rather rationalize away and neglect its very real concrete existence. This evil may be so powerful as not just to coerce but to actively nullify and overcome the volitional freewill and freedom of an agent. In other words, when we conceive of such a being, which scenario do we imagine as all the more evil? The privation theory where we have the responsibility and choice to cultivate evil into existence? Is this the nebulous true evil which we by further emphasis can individually and collectively eradicate or render impotent? Or alternatively is it possible that evil exists and is all the more so powerful its elusive essence can nullify our volitional free will and possess us to fulfil its own evil ends? I’d entertain the idea that the latter definition is the more frightening of options.
This shall be the main focus of our investigation. Both suggested ontologies presuppose free will. One rejects the concrete reality of evil. The other provides a concrete and conscious foundation of evil as an immaterial personified entity with nothing but heinous and nefarious designs, with perhaps an agenda to remain undetected and spread its evil tentacles of influence. As mentioned, free will is inclusive in both suggested frameworks. In general I think the theist can maintain a monotheistic belief under both positions, as long as the evil is grounded with a meaningful and legitimate purpose. Even if we can’t be certain or understand that mysterious purpose. This hesitant and non-committed sentiment in theological circles is termed sceptical theism. Sceptical theism, as highlighted, professes ignorance as well as trust and faith in God’s sovereignty regarding the levels of evil that deity permits. These evils are justifiable in the mysterious way only God possibly understands. I think it’s fair to assert also, regarding the above scenarios, and without thorough investigation, that a dualistic theism may also accept both suggested evil frameworks. Is there another option, and if so what is that framework for evil?
The Third Way, Framing A Naturalistic Paradigm Of Evil
I am not familiar with a third option or well read in the literature but I’d suggest that the third way would travel a naturalistic route. This would involve a reinterpretation of option one. From this naturalistic perspective evil could perhaps be described as something similar to a form of privation. An impersonal and necessary, mechanistic and evolutionary, accumulative and probabilistic result of the universal laws of physics. A process which both provides as well as negates the earthly flourishing of life. This is a definition I think the theist could also affirm and find agreeable. As long as it can be granted that a world with some evil is necessarily the very best and most reasonable world actualised by an omnipotent deity. This definition should not be confused with and should not exclude the future world of the heavenly realm.
This third way definitional framework may be the most parsimonious and adaptable. First it provides a naturalistic explanatory framework for impersonal natural evils. Natural evil can thereby be reduced to the mathematical and descriptive laws of physics. In this sense and under all conceivable frameworks discussed, it follows that natural evil is merely the result of fairly predictable naturally ordered environmental causation. For example, the water cycle provides fertilization for the earth. Rainwater scatters and pools to satiate the thirst of creatures and vegetation. Yet prolonged torrential rainfall can cause a flash flood which flushes the soil, distributes essential nutrients, uproots vegetation and displaces and drowns creatures. Both states of affairs demonstrate that rain performs an important and necessary environmental function. It is important for our investigation to note that without specifically taking into account the essential purpose of rain and its consequences, we might personally describe the rain in and of itself as relative, and as neither good nor evil.
We might also alternatively agree that depending on our subjective and personal anthropomorphic perspective. The first scenario may intuitively be described as good and the second as bad state of affairs. Although there may be long term benefits to a flash flood, the loss of life and perceived damages to the agrian infrastructure have a visible and immediate negative consequence. However if we disregard our personal perspective and detach ourselves from viewing the causation or consequences as either positive or negative. It can be seen that when this method is applied, that in some simple sense rain can be considered true to its purpose and fulfills its potential to water the earth. Therefore, under this set parameter rain is good no matter the cause or consequences. It falls on the righteous as well as the wicked.
Additionally at first glance the third way can potentially reject or adopt free will and still function as a naturalistic explanation and account for moral evil. I think the general majority of theists part ways with this ideal when asked to adopt the idea of any form of determinism. Under this further contention moral evil itself may become an unavoidable inevitable relative arbitrary force, which I think arguably has no detrimental effect that can be measured or valued objectively as either good or bad. Evil may simply cease to exist or become entirely relative. Thus if we accept determinism this may have further consequences for those that deploy the problem of evil objection. We will stop at this juncture and return to the deterministic question shortly when we visit the proposed thought experiment. For now I’d like to assert the claim that anyone advocating that there is a problem of evil, whilst maintaining a deterministic outlook, probably doesn’t have a meaningful definition of evil. At present these deterministic entailments are beyond the scope of this cursory and introductory examination.
Framing The Problem Of Evil
We’ve rushed our way through the problem of evil thus far without dwelling on framing the actual problem. This is because the problem itself is very easy to intuit. If there is an all powerful and all knowing and all benevolent God, or rather alternatively and in classical theistic terminology. If God is truly omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent then why is there an abundance of evil in the world? In other words, if God is omniscient, he would be aware and have knowledge of all types of evil before they come to pass. Armed with omnipotent power God would not just know how to prevent these evils from happening, he would have the power and means to engage and stop the fruition of all significant evils. It follows that if God is truly omnibenevolent, then he would eliminate said significant evils. However, there seems to be far too much suffering and injustice in our world. Suffering not just perceptually from within the human perspective, but seemingly ceaseless suffering in the animal kingdom. If God is good, why does he not stop the suffering? Is it because he doesn’t know about it, does he lack omniscience? Does God not care? Then is he not a benevolent deity? Or does God lack the omnipotent attribute without the power and means to uproot and terminate evil? Rather than submit to this mountainous problem and abandon one of these omni-attributes, the theist instead seeks to understand the problem and find reasonable means to come to a justified and convincing or even an uncertain but settling solution. One such solution we touched upon earlier was sceptical theism. The easiest solution to this problem for many an atheist is to arrive at what they’re convinced appears to be a seemingly logical reason to jettison the belief in God.
The Privation Theory Of Evil
Now that we’ve framed and spelt out the problem and why it is problematic for theism. The stage is almost set to continue the investigation and present the proposed thought experiment. Before we wade through such foreign territory it’s important to touch upon the privation theory of evil. This theory states that evil has no ontological substance or being in and of itself. It is rather in some logical sense the absence of goodness. In other words, in an Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and somewhat Parmenidean sense, evil does not coexist as the polar opposite of good. This is the conclusion arrived at by both Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. This conclusion was established through both a biblical and philosophical lens. Augustine rationalized that everything that exists has potential to be good, when something falls short of that potential, evil is said to arise and actualize from the very absence of goodness. Augustine provided a simple example to distinguish between a lack of something, and an absence of something by drawing an analogy of a rock and blindness. A rock cannot be said to have an absence of blindness because it does not have the potential for sight. A human on the other hand has the potential for sight and therefore blindness can legitimately be predicated as the absence of sight. This absence we would define under the privation model as a form of actualized evil arising from the absence of goodness. Before his conversion to Roman Catholicism Augustine was a Manichean. Manicheans were a gnostic dualistic quasi Christian sect that believed in an ongoing cosmic battle between good and evil. Augustine’s theory of privation would have been the laboured result of a labyrinth of thought he would have navigated throughout his conversion. The privation theory of evil would have also been a historical polemic against not just the Manicheans, but any form of dualistic theism and paganism. I mentioned this because it is related to our ongoing investigation and the proposed thought experiment to shortly follow.
Critiques Of Privation Theory
A common critique of privation theory is that it doesn’t wash away the problem of evil in the mud. According to such critics “The problem of evil remains fully intact.” and the inference that God should decrease the absences of goodness in the world remains allegedly justified. Furthermore, it is explained by the critics, skeptics and atheists alike that privation theory doesn’t prove that evil doesn’t exist. All of this may be a very simple way of looking at the theory. It could perhaps even be a humble misunderstanding of the privation of evil as there is much nuance to further consider. It may not prove that evil doesn’t exist but it does suggest that the potential for evil can somehow be eventually eliminated or at least minimized, not necessarily by a deity but by willing agents of free will.
Positive And Negative Interdependence Parody
Furthermore, an attempt can be made to reverse privation theory, this argument claims that Good and Evil or rather positive and negative are interdependent opposite ends of a spectrum. An entailment of this is that goodness cannot exist without evil. This would anchor us in a dualistic theism. Augustine explains the absence of goodness with his rock/blindness illustration. If the dualist interdependent symmetry argument is correct, it implies that blindness from birth is a positive impurity, or flipped as a negative purity rather than a condition of absence. We could alternatively describe this blindness as a negative impurity. This means that positive purification would cure and restore blindness with sight. We use the verb restore, because sight is a potential predicate of vision inherent to humanity. This demonstrates that blindness is a condition of absence. Therefore, I think Augustine’s illustration softly refutes the presented interdependent symmetrical parody. Goodness can exist without evil, but evil has no light or shadow to stand next to if there is a total lack of potential or rather a complete absence of benevolence.
Alternative Routes To Privation
I think if the privation theory doesn’t immediately appeal to the sceptical objector, then we need to explore an alternative route to answering the perennial problem in order to shed some light on why the privation theory is correctly and reasonably deployed. When it comes to moral evil it seems to me that free will is an important piece of the jigsaw that cannot be ignored. So, in response to the problem of evil, I think presupposing free will is required and essential. I feel that it is important to carefully walk through this problem with a walking stick so we don’t miss any of the steps. If we possess free will then the standard apologetic reply to the objection, or rather the question of at least why there is any moral evil, as implied and asserted above in the introductory part of this essay and now further reiterated below once more. We have the freedom to refrain or choose either good or evil in our day to day activities. Therefore we are free responsible agents. This basic idea of freedom, or rather free will is worth pausing on for a moment. Let us keep this assumption in mind and question further the idea of evil and how it relates to free will
The Ultimate Evil Being Theodicy
Let us first conceive of an extremely powerful ultimate evil being (UEB). All evil is grounded in this source of evil personified. Let us initially imagine that this evil being is so powerful it can override, possess and effectively nullify an agent’s free will for its own nefarious purposes. I think if such a being existed, the power to nullify free will in this way would ultimately be superfluous and I’ll explain why. The powerful evil entity could directly commit any ominous goal within its means, but these actions and their consequences would be the result of its own evil inclinations and as the being is evil personified, these actions for a lack of better terminology would paradoxically be considered good, insofar as they are actioned according to its established nature. Therefore even if such a being operated in a subtle way hidden in plain sight, temporarily activating agent possession and weaving through the high echelons of Machiavellian society, forcefully nullifying or better yet, influencing the volition of key figures of state, orchestrating global events in order to cause a domino effect that maximises evil. Despite all its efforts, I think such a malevolent being would be a paradoxical and impotent contradictory beast indeed.
Experimental Deterministic Entailments
Furthermore, I think it extremely important to note that such an entity would be dependent on nullifying or obfuscating the freedom of human agents. This would mean that free will, as outlined on more than one occasion above, is an important metaphysical assumption for us to consider and investigate when tackling this problem and constructing this thought experiment. If we as agents do not have free will, then I think this would entail far reaching consequences, not just for ourselves but more importantly for the personification of ultimate evil itself. Furthermore, the idea of losing our autonomy to an evil being, as terrible as we can imagine it would be, is not such a horrendous thought to conceive if we are mere casually deterministic beings. Why? You may ask and wonder?
Grading And Measuring Evil
It seems to me, that if we are to attempt to measure the abhorrence of an evil act, that same exact act is a greater evil, if and only if the evil being we have discussed can prompt the agent to commit an evil of their own volition. This would be a worse and dare I say it, purer evil deed than if the ultimate evil being itself carried out the same evil via the forced abduction or possession of an agent’s free will. Why do I think this is the case? If it’s not obvious to the reader, I would say this is the case because it is a misuse and manipulation of an agent’s volition and a willing coercion of an agent’s gifted freedom of choice. A violation of choice and not a forced nullification and possession of will. In other words, when coerced the agent has themselves to blame. The agent would have analogously and literally fallen short of their potential of their own free will. This is all the more abhorrent because it takes an innocent being, created for their own purposes and perverts and prevents them from exercising their will for their own good, family, friends and ultimately that of society and creation. This seems to me to be a far greater injustice and far greater evil and betrayal of our God given purpose.
Conclusions Of Deterministic Evil
Therefore I think that if we are beings without free will and live casually deterministic lives. Then the evils we see or commit are detached from our own personal responsibility. Instead of objective evil, we’d have a mere diluted relative evil. I think we can further reason our way to this conclusion with the following understanding. If the hypothetical UEB exists in a deterministic world. Then the evils committed by that evil being seem to become arbitrary and less evil without the violation of free will. Furthermore, in such a world, it is worth stating clearly that coercing an agent’s free will becomes incoherent and nonsensical. The UEB itself becomes governed by modes of deterministic causation. We’d have a deterministic hijacking of deterministic agents. It follows but still bears stating, you can’t coerce anyone or anything in such a fabricated mechanistic predetermined world.
The Operational Freedom Of Evil
It seems that if we are to suitably define evil, then evil must be that which perverts or rather more accurately, evil is simply contrary to the natural order. If we are still working with the privation theory of evil, then this definition can be made analogously compatible. Therefore, it additionally seems contrasting or contradictory in some sense that the idea of the UEB equipped with the property and power to nullify or possess the active free will of an agent arguably seems superfluous. Superfluous in both a deterministic world and furthermore, equally as unnecessary in the more intuitively preferred present natural world of causal freedom. Therefore, if such a being were to exist, in order to maximise its potential for evil, this parasitic and malignant being would be contingent at all times on a free will framework. It would be completely dependent on the coercion of agents of free will to actualize any greater and purer evil, and ultimately to cultivate its highest and most terrible existence. Now, a familiar objection may be made at this point. Someone may object or point out that this hypothetical malevolent being can technically be ruled out and excluded from possessing the attribute of omnipotence. This objection is a red herring. It attempts to divert us down the evil God route, and before we’ve established how we’ve arrived at such a crossroad. We will investigate this shortly. Before we walk that path, we should stick to the topic.
Reiterating The Summary Of Ultimate Evil
Reiterating and returning to the present summary, please keep in mind where we’ve arrived thus far. The hypothetical UEB must and can only necessarily actualize its potential for greater evils, not by forcefully nullifying free will, but by perverting the volition of agents of free will to maximise its potential for pure evil. Therefore, and this is important to note and reiterate finally once more. The ability to forcefully nullify free will, for this reason just stated seems arguably superfluous for the goals of such a being of evil personified. Additionally, if the UEB were to forcefully nullify free will to commit and maximise evil. This power would be paradoxical to wield, as the use of such a power would in fact be a force of benevolence. This is because the UEB would be aligned with its goals and created purpose. Please also note that I’ve tried to demonstrate that in a deterministic world evil becomes an arbitrary and relative force at best. We have also returned to the classical position and defined and conceptualized evil as that which perverts or is contrary to the natural order. It seems to me that by this definition evil as traditionally suggested is best conceptualized and described as a privation of the natural order. If the natural order is to maximize good then it follows that evil is the absence or rather the privation of good. It also seems interesting and subtle to further consider the superfluous powers already imagined and rationally dismissed entirely. If we were to arbitrarily grant the UEB with special volitional causal power and conceive of it operating with this power instead in a deterministic world. The contrary to natural order in such a world might be to grant deterministic agents the free will ability.
Doubting The Existence Of Such A Beast
Therefore, in all above circumstances, in order for the UEB to be effective it must work within a free will dynamic. However, due to the superfluous ability mentioned and its heavy dependence on contingent beings for its own active existence. I find myself doubting the existence of such a being. However, if such an evil being were created, it would perhaps be immoral and the very definition of pure evil if God were to restrain such a creature from actively seeking to fulfill its potential for evil. Further paradoxes await. We are reminded of how the problem of evil is framed as a critique. If God could not find purpose for such a beast then God would potentially be rendered incompetent and without the omniscient knowledge to find purpose for such a personified evil. Furthermore, this failure would lead to a potential, and I use my words purposefully, illusory loss of the omnipotent property. Yet such a beast, by its very nature is ontologically nebulous, it is contrary to the natural order, its essence is the paradoxical privation of goodness. Its evil operations paradoxically fulfill its divine purpose benevolently. Therefore, it seems to me that such a beast might be founded on a logical contradiction, either that or the personification of the ultimate evil cannot exist in a way which we can logically comprehend. It seems we have circled back on ourselves and missed a loop. I think an omnibenevolent deity would forfeit its benevolence if it were to avoid the creation of the ultimate evil being. Therefore to create such a being, contrary to the objection and presumed observed entailments of the subjective excessive abundance of evil, to create such an ultimate evil being would be an incalculable act of compassion, power, and knowledge. For this reason, I think the problem of evil fails to convey or refute the existence of the omni-attributed deity.
In The Shadow Of The Beast
With this in mind I think it is evident that if evil didn’t exist, we would find a way to make it tangible and that tangible doubt itself may be enough to make it seem real. There are further reasons to doubt the existence of this alternative evil beast. Free will is humanity’s greatest and most precious gift, whilst simultaneously our most tragic folly when misused. Therefore there may not be a legitimate indefinite need for a devilish enticer to further test the limits of our potentiality. We can misuse our free will and commit atrocious evils all without being led down the garden path by the bit. In fact, all the properties we have listed and permitted of the ultimate evil being to possess, we ourselves seem to master naturally and have the ability to further cultivate and actualize. The most important attribute we discussed of the UEB was the ability to manipulate and violate the agency of free will. This is an attribute that we also personify and share, this is something that happens every day all over the world in countless different ways.
The Free Will Defence And Ultimate Evil Being Conclusion
In conclusion, when we integrate the UEB theodicy the conclusion of the free will defence is not that free will is so valuable that it justifies all evils. This would be a concrete and hasty conclusion avoiding all nuance that we have considered. Ultimately the free will defence demonstrates that an omnipotent deity exists. Why? As elaborated previously above, an omnipotent deity could create an ultimate evil being, a being capable of the most heinous evil, and he can give that being the freedom to commit any vile evil it so desires. If God refuses to create such an UEB then this refusal would somewhat be the definition of evil itself. It follows that a benevolent deity would create such a being, and is God not omnibenevolent? An omniscient deity would have a purpose for such a being, and is God not omniscient? Finally, an omnipotent deity could restrain and cultivate benevolence from such a magnificent and horrific beast. This almost seems like a miraculous walking and talking logical contradiction. For me, it follows that we are this creature, and it bares repeating again, contrary to what the problem of evil tries to assert; for God to have made us is an incalculable demonstration of compassion, power, and knowledge. When we act contrary to our nature we are the ultimate personification of evil. It is in our hands to wield weapons of war or to cultivate the earth. Simultaneously we possess the ultimate created potential of benevolence.
Do The Devil And Demonic Entities Exist
Rejecting the initial existence of the UEB does not mean that Satan doesn’t exist. From a traditional Jewish and Christian perspective the linguistically anglicized שָׂטָן transliterates as Satan and translates as the accuser or adversary. This celestial being is similar to the description of UEB in our thought experiment. The difference is that this mysterious fallen angelic being is the prosecutor and enemy of God’s people. He is given the power and authority to audit our book of life. Depending on how we have utilized our free will, we will be prosecuted by this accuser in celestial court for any reason that can be mustered which God hasn’t already concealed. This is a very brief sketch on a related subject that requires more attention but isn’t essential to our investigation. Without delving into the details at this time, we can affirm according to scripture the existence of the demonic realm.
The Evil God Hypothesis
Now that we have thoroughly investigated and formed what I believe to be a reasonable response to the problem of evil objection. Without further distractions I believe we can return and start our path upon the analysis of the evil god hypothesis. This was the objection identified as the red herring which wasn’t addressed earlier and set aside. We have since entertained the idea of a powerful personified evil entity. Such an entity may be accused of lacking omnipotence as it would require our free will to maximize and actualize its purest potentialities of evil. We can observe that this critique is similar reminder of the Evil God Hypothesis. This hypothesis is relevant to our investigation and will require some further elaboration.
The Evil God Hypothesis is a sceptical polemical thought experiment which asks us to conceive of a malevolent deity in the place of the traditional benevolent one. In this sense the same critique above could be flipped and mirrored. We could say that it is possible that a benevolent deity could also be said not to possess the attribute of omnipotence. As a benevolent deity would also require our free will to maximize and actualize the purest potentialities of goodness. This same critique can be inverted on all possible apologetic theodicies that give plausible reasons for the many evils we encounter or witness from afar in the world. I shall attempt to answer this critique, and in a way in which I hope will further boost the confidence of the theist and demonstrate a reasonable doubt for the atheist. Perhaps I remain too optimistic.
In Response, God’s Essence And Appeal To Mystery
If there is an omnipotent God, then it should be carefully considered that the essence and purposes of that being could be beyond the confines of our finite and inadequate conceptualization. That being, as the author of all life and existence would be beyond the concept of being itself and additionally beyond our finite categories of good and evil. This is not to say that language is inadequate to describe the unseen presence of that being. We can apprehend such a deity through its works, and language is one of its works in which we can sketch the contours of its power and existence. Therefore, we can detect the residual residue of omnipotent actions and creative works. This means we have the sense capacity to perceive or interact with its energies yet remain totally in the dark on the core of its essential essence. I think presupposing and admitting our ignorance of God’s unknowable essence and creative goals theoretically gives us room to attribute God as the creative foundation of the anthropomorphic notions of both good and evil. In other words both creative categories exist for purposes only God can make perfect or reveal. Furthermore, and I should state this clearly lest I be misunderstood, I am by no means suggesting that God’s essence contains any iota of evil.
Is The Evil God Hypothesis A Strawman?
If this is true then it would be accurate to observe that the EGH is a strawman falsely predicted on a dualistic or additionally perhaps a shallow perspective of parody. The advocates for this polemic don’t seriously hold to the position that an evil deity exists. Rather the stance is taken as an attack on theism which attempts to demonstrate for everything a benevolent deity can do for the greater good, a malevolent deity can also accomplish as its opposite for a greater evil. It attempts to demonstrate that apologists on both sides of the argument, in defence of the traditional benevolent deity, and the alternative antithesis atheistic parody, can apologetically spar for and against the malevolent deity. This attempts to demonstrate that both positions can construct inverse polar opposite arguments to support and provide reasons for why either a malevolent or benevolent deity would allow or create in such a way as to permit the goodness, or evils of X Y and Z for a greater evil or the maximization of goodness. This is supposed to expose the theistic position as vacuous and without proper justification or reasonable foundation. However, as pointed out above, if God is the creative foundation of both good and evil then this critique fails to provide solid and unshakeable reason to reject theism. However, for some this doesn’t solve the problem of evil, yet it may provide a personal subjectively justified and haughty emotional reason to deny deity is worthy of obedience and worship.
Misunderstanding Omnipotence And Free Will
However, if a powerful evil deity exists as the foundation of ultimate evil and all creation. If that being cannot actualize its potential of pure evil without influencing the freedom of moral agents, then would this technicality preclude such an evil deity from possessing the attributes of omnipotence? In other words, according to the EGH would a benevolent deity also be excluded from the omnipotent attribute if it also requires the freedom of moral agents to actualise and maximize the pure potential of universal goodness?
In reply, I think an omnipotent deity need not require the freedom of moral agents to maximize its universal goals. I think to conclude that such a deity requires agents of free will is a misunderstanding of omnipotence and the hierarchical mechanics of exercising free will. Agents owe their creation and every fibre and moment of their being to the creator. If one can commit a good or evil deed it is because of the mercy of God that they have the ways and means to entertain and actualize both good and evil. An omnipotent and omniscient God would know all potential outcomes of a person’s decisions and scattered life path. Furthermore, and considering the above, it is common to consider and acknowledge that any good deed we can do, we accomplish not by our own power but by the power and compassion of God. When the saints and prophets miraculously heal the sick or raise the dead, it is not through their own source of power, but rather through the submission of their will in unison with the will of God.
Similarly, but not quite the same, as we have discussed when addressing the problem of evil. If we are instead now entertaining the idea of an evil deity with a similar yet inverted hierarchical operational method, that deity would not require our free will, in precisely the same way, we would be contingent on such an ordered creation to exercise our volition as we are now. However, a purely evil deity may choose an entirely different creative order. As we discussed previously when we analysed the concept of the UEB. We concluded that an UEB would possess superfluous power if it were capable of forcefully nullifying the volition of an agent of free will. A benevolent deity would also have this non-effective power but would not choose to exercise it. We concluded that the evils committed by any said possessed agent are not committed of their own volition but rather orchestrated and compelled by the evil one.
I don’t think it unfair to suggest that a malevolent deity which has the ability to permanently overpower our own personal volition wouldn’t necessarily restrain itself from exercising such a superfluous power. Therefore, and I may be somehow mistaken, but I think it follows that if we aren’t entertaining the idea of the UEB, but rather an omnipotent evil deity, we are simply using our finite conceptual categories of good and evil for a being beyond the predication of such terrestrial definitions. Therefore if God is beyond being, and beyond good and evil, then the EGH falls short of the mark of inflicting any doubt for theism.
Final Thoughts And Conclusions
Therefore, because of these objections and contingencies and quagmires entailed with the free will response, however practical it may seem to be for explaining moral evil in a brief sentence. Depending on how the response is articulated, if briefly, it can be portrayed weakly, it must be nuanced and approached carefully, without this caution it can potentially be rendered incoherent when not expressed or examined closely and objectively. Yet however sticky it may first seem, I think the problem of evil doesn’t defeat theism, rather it raises some interesting questions. How do we define and grade evil, and what is pure evil? I have tried to answer these questions. I haven’t fully covered or provided a range of theodicies for natural evils such as natural disasters, but apologetic responses are out there to find and I may further elaborate on this upon at a later date. Perhaps I haven’t provided answers convincing enough to cast reasonable doubt amongst the swirling tide of atheists. Perhaps I haven’t said anything to convince the agnostic, and maybe I haven’t covered any new ground. But I did have an idea and I had to work through it after prematurely publishing its initial germination.
I hope that someone will find this essay not just an interesting or entertaining read, but that it might provide a little food for thought and somehow make a little difference for someone else. I believe introducing the idea of the hypothetical ultimate evil being was beneficial to contemplate and contextualize what may be the true nature of evil. I may be mistaken and influenced by personal bias but I think it justifies and explains some of the nuances involved in the examination of privation theory as well as illuminating and justifying the free will response to moral evil. However if evil is a privation, then I think something more than the individual’s free will is needed to resist evil intentions or inclinations. If this external empowering source does not exist then pure evil cannot be resisted by oneself. Yet, on occasion we do seem to resist forms of evil, we do this by what seems as our own power or because we are somehow empowered or facing a lesser and more manageable evil. If true and pure evil does in fact exist, as a privation of the good or even as a being, then we should pray to avoid it and count ourselves fortunate enough not to encounter an irresistible and powerful compelling evil foe or force.