Introduction
A few months ago I listened to several podcast episodes from Emerson Green. Eventually Emerson’s Substack appeared in my xcom feed and I read his then newly published post entitled Theism’s Demand—Is it morally wrong to believe in God? On my first reading of this short essay I came away with a slight misunderstanding. I have since read through it several times. Although I find it excellent to ponder the ethical questions involved, I feel there are a few constructive critiques I could make on the presentation of his argumentation.
I do not need these presentational critiques in order to launch the main thesis and thought experiment which acts as the main thrust of my counter-argument. This counter-argument, by itself, may not act as a refutational defeater which stands entirely on its own; however, I do provide additional argumentative support to directly challenge and dispute all the claims articulated in Green’s essay.
I will start with identifying what I perceive to be inconsistencies and possible ambiguities which I believe weaken the rhetorical and emotive force of Emerson’s argument.
1. Metaethical Moral Ambiguity
My first concern is metaethical moral ambiguity. Emerson argues persuasively that belief in God entails an evaluative normative claim. I think this is undeniable, and speaking as a theist, I believe many fellow theists will fall over themselves and agree wholeheartedly that belief in God automatically entails evaluative normative claims. The crux of the argument is that Emerson, like many agnostics and atheists—seems to justifiably reject the belief in God due to its evaluative emotive ethical commitments.
1.1: Descriptive Claims
From observing natural processes Emerson infers the descriptive claim that reality in-and-of-itself is indifferent to pain and suffering. Pain and suffering is merely just the result of metaphysically universal observable laws and contingent evolutionary processes.
This neutrally evaluative and somewhat passive commitment entails that the atheist or agnostic is relieved of any obligatory requirement to explain the existence of pain and suffering in any evaluative normative sense.
1.2: Theism’s Normative Commitments
In contrast, the theist doesn’t have this non-committal luxury. If theism is true, it is assumed that pain and suffering isn’t the mere result of contingent natural processes. Suffering exists because of a divine causal agent and if the deity is omnibenevolent, suffering exists necessarily for a good moral reason.
This presupposition entails that to believe in an omnibenevolent deity is to tacitly sanctify, permit, endorse and somehow endow and live with the totality of pain and suffering in the world with intrinsic value and meaningful purpose. The acceptance of theistic belief therefore tacitly entails evaluative and normative commitments.
1.3: Revisiting Intrinsic Impermissibles
Emerson seems to term the accumulative set of all pain and suffering in the world as ‘intrinsic impermissibles’. What he means by this term is described hypothetically in relational measurement to theism. He doesn’t explain his own metaethical commitments and by extension the foundation of his normative framework is left ambiguous and unclear.
What he does share in common ground with theism is partially revealed in this innovative term. An intrinsic impermissible seems to be an intuitive and practical application of some form of moral realism and universal moral absolutes. Therefore, and according to Emerson’s own normative terminology, any intrinsic impermissible is morally wrong all of the time and under all circumstances.
1.4: The Uncertain Ontology of Intrinsic Impermissibles
Examples of intrinsic impermissibles are given of deer and children dying in house and forest fires. But this might unintentionally leave open an interpretive window to conflate descriptive intrinsic impermissibles with what might be prescriptive absolutes and objective moral values. Values and prescriptions which can be descriptively redacted—reduced to common phenomenological experience and are additionally objectively wrong per se, or alternatively, are events flagged as violating constructivist universal categorical imperatives to neither cause any unnecessary suffering or harm. In other words are intrinsic impermissibles held to phenomenological or metaphysical objective standards?
It is unclear which of these options might be the case. Regardless of which, it safely seems that knowledge of each intrinsic impermissible is an emotively undesirable contingent state of direct or detached participatory affairs. The set of which are somehow seemingly absolutely intrinsically impermissible.
As outlined above, it is evident that Emerson hasn’t developed a clear picture of the ontology of intrinsic impermissibles. It is difficult to know if they are objective absolutes, or subjective and emotive normative states or a combination of some or all of the above?
This ambiguity may raise an intentional tension, and without a clear metaethical stance, intrinsic impermissibles seem to be humanistic constructivist and emotive ethical projections merely superimposed over naturalistic descriptive states.
1.5: Normatively Neutral Intrinsic impermissibles
From the atheistic or agnostic naturalist paradigm, intrinsic impermissibles are paradoxically normatively neutral, yet it bears remembering, unlike theists—the atheist or agnostic isn’t necessarily metaphysically required to evaluate and integrate the occurrence of intrinsic impermissibles. This is because according to their paradigm there is no metaphysical burden of proof required to justify the existence of said intrinsic impermissibles—perhaps this is precisely why the ontology isn’t explicated and given a critical foundation and is instead only emotively expressed.
As such the atheist or agnostic is paradoxically off the metaphysical hook. As an agent they can approve, disapprove, or remain dispassionately indifferent—similar to the universe itself. This seems to perhaps point towards an emotivist metaethical stance.
This normatively neutral naturalistic position demonstrates a parsimony of lesser commitment when advocating for agnosticism and atheism. What should be noted however, is that without clear transparent metaethical grounding; there really is no reason for the theist to accept the evaluative challenge presented directly in Emerson’s essay.
Furthermore, this observation leads to an open and perhaps unanswerable question. Does the agnostic or atheist need to account or construct any universal or subjective existential purpose and meaning and more importantly if naturalism is true can anyone?
1.6: Introductory Conclusion
It would seem there is no individual choice in this rhetorical matter. Nevertheless, I believe I have understood and summarised Emerson’s argument fairly. I feel this initial soft critique of its presentation is accurate.
Furthermore, it might have been a deliberate strategic choice not to reveal metaethical commitments upfront as this provides a conceptual fog of war which shields and clouds this important and perhaps vulnerable issue.
2: The Emotivist Objection
It seems intrinsic impermissibles have a rhetorical emotive impact. The main thrust of the thesis is that agnostics and atheists that resonate with Emerson’s essay seem to openly concede and confess an unwillingness to accept theism on emotive grounds. Without an explicitly declared metaethical position, I can only infer that this rejection is eloquently emotive.
Although I suspect the thesis may be grounded in some form of undeclared moral realism, if this were not the case then without actual moral facts the argument as presented lacks the ability to convincingly critique objective normative frameworks and thereby may collapse into subjectivism. This would undermine its persuasive force and further reduces any impact on theists and arguably alternate forms of atheism.
I mention this in passing and will spend no further time addressing the superficial entailments of this speculation. This has been established sufficiently.
I will now formally raise the objection that the main thesis of Emerson’s essay, regardless of any declared metaethical foundation, is asserted upon emotive reasoning—even if Emerson doesn’t hold to emotivism itself and is vested in alternative metaethical commitments the logical plausibility of my forthcoming critique in principle will still stand.
I construct my argumentation with the methodology of a thought experiment to challenge and undermine the coherency within the metaethical position of emotivism itself.
It should be reiterated that although Emerson and many atheists may not be strict emotivists—my aim with this objection is to rebut the thesis that emotive reasoning—that is, the disapproval of intrinsic impermissibles is not only vague and potentially without truth value, but when pushed to an extremely certain atheistic or non-committal agnostic logical conclusion, is altogether an incoherent and illogical reason for rejecting theism’s perceived tacitly normative entailments.
I will show that this central normative claim and concern which serves as the cornerstone of Emerson’s argument is rather rooted in an incomplete epistemology and not in the garments of which it is dressed—as an ethical normative objection.
2.1: EMO – The Emotive Mastery Objection
I assert that it is hypothetically metaphysically conceivable, possible, and logical for an agent to harness or develop emotive mastery. Such an agent—and especially under the emotivist paradigm, would have the capacity to master all emotion. This would include the agent’s own emotive responses to internal and external stimuli and additionally the ability to selectively induce emotional responses within all agents encountered.
Such an agent would have the capacity, but would not necessarily need to ever lie or manipulate emotional cognition and mechanisms within any agents. An agent of emotive mastery would not need to violate the free will of other agents to induce any intentional emotive desire and belief. In other words—an agent with emotive mastery would de-facto become an arbitrator and somewhat paradoxically for emotivism an unofficial legislator and prescriber of emotivist normativity.
Yet such an agent’s normative powers would have no intrinsic ontological grounding and would be subject to contingent environmental conditions—social and evolutionary pressures and nomological laws and forces. Under this hypothetical the metaphysical question of free will is still entertained and not necessarily negated. The agent of emotive mastery can theoretically influence any other agent against their own initial convictions and thereby instill a volitional polar opposite belief and desire.
It is worth noting whatever the agent believes and however the agent acts and uses this emotive mastery is neither measured as true or false—emotivism entails that there are no truth values to emotive statements. All the agent can do is induce approval and disapproval and thereby influence the desire and actions of all other agents.
In the following section I slightly digress to include an in-depth detailed but not systematic examination of the entailments of this metaethical thought experiment. All of which are seemingly without contradiction and when conceded by the consistent atheist or agnostic—logically lead to the possible self-defeating nature of any emotivist assertion and in this particular case—plausibly undermines the paradigmatic evaluative normativity objection Emerson gives for rejecting theism.
2.3: Collapsing Emotivism
Before continuing, the metaphysical consequences and finer details of this thought experiment should be fleshed out. I think it’s important and necessary to provide a brief examination and deconstruction of emotivism. I will be as brief and concise as possible.
2.4: Emotive Sensibilities
It’s crucial to note that if emotivism is true the master can induce any desire and belief in any agent and doesn’t need to lie or manipulate, lying and manipulation are normative concepts and only fictionally wrong if either the speaker or listener disapprove of the lie. The essential question becomes, how is emotivism ontologically grounded? Or in other words—what desires and beliefs ought they arbitrate and legislate?
If emotivism is true, the answer can only be whatever the emotive master decides, even if that decision is made on the attitude toward a coin toss or on a mere whim. The decision is made according to the emotive master’s absolute emotive sensibilities.
2.5: Emotive Means To An End
The agent with emotive mastery would seem to have an emotive will whether to decide and self-impose limits on its emotive causal powers, there is no reason for or against this decision. Therefore, when the emotive master induces a belief in any receptive agent this would necessarily entail identifying the agent as a justifiable means to an end and endowing them with a telos specified by the emotive master. In other words, purpose and goals embraced volitionally by the receptive agent necessarily align with the emotive master’s absolute emotive will.
2.6: Emotivist Epistemology
Thus, with or without an emotive master, emotivist epistemology is rooted not in rational deliberation, convenience, favour, external environmental pressures or any other factors we might want to attribute; rather, it is grounded in stance dependent and interdependent emergent attitudes—emotive feelings toward these factors. With the inclusion of a hypothetical emotive master emotivism would be given an identifiable relative and fluctuating epistemic grounding. Nevertheless, this would ultimately establish emotivism as it has always been classified, a non-cognitive form of subjectivism and relativism.
This isn’t because the emotive master has all necessary alternative means of persuasion at their disposal, but emotive mastery is the key self-justifying attribute. It is this unique attribute possessed only by the master that authorises their own and therefore collective normative attitudes and establishes themselves as the head of the hierarchical subjective moral order. If emotivism is true the emotive master is unable to truly act altruistically; they can only hold an attitude towards altruism.
2.7: Emotivist Relativism
Furthermore, to highlight the relativity of emotivism we can introduce an additional emotive master with the same emotive causal powers. This hierarchical subjective moral order will come into dispute. A receptive agent may be induced with two different and contradicting separate prerogatives, one from EM-1 and the other from EM-2; when this happens the receptive agent is paralysed by the relative choice of which master they are justified to obey.
2.8: Emotivism Deconstructed
This thought experiment demonstrates that if emotivism were entirely true; the pre-established accompanying relativistic historic moral order would have been initially ignorantly founded on feel good and disapproving principles. Thus, pure emotivism de-facto entails several absurdities mentioned above. Thus, any normativity solely derived from emotivism is conjured from nebulous epistemic naturalistic influences.
These pressures are arbitrary yet seemingly individually contextually valid subjective attitudes and beliefs, which I think means that emotivism isn’t necessarily entirely false. However, it certainly collapses under its own relative shadow and best serves as the handmaiden to an already contingent or objectively established moral order. Thus in passing, if emotivism is the one true moral theory, it cannot be considered true, but we can have really strong feelings that it might be true.
2.9: Divine Emotive Mastery
This soft refutation of emotivism doesn’t negate our thought experiment. Such an agent of emotive mastery is nevertheless metaphysically logical, conceivable, and possible—even as a contingent being.
Therefore, when we transition this agency to an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent deity—it seems obvious that such a being could easily induce a volitional belief within the agent that hesitates to accept theism on merely normative emotive grounds. Furthermore, an agent of emotive mastery imbued with traditional omni-powers would have the capacity not to merely arbitrate moral legislation as a conduit, but could directly serve as the foundation of all moral principles and as fountainhead and source of all moral intuitions and prescribed normativity.
Certainly such an omniscient being would know how ought best to use emotive causal powers without any motivational contingent influences. Thus, an agnostic regarding theism is by definition uncertain about the existence or nonexistence of deity. Therefore, if an agnostic can accept the logic of the EMO argument and is also an emotivist, then both in theory and in sincere practice, they are technically open to emotive persuasion or revelation.
Lacking the primacy of the emotivist ethos and perhaps holding to intuitionism or alternative forms of moral realism doesn’t entirely escape the logic of this thought experiment. The moral realist could partially counter and press the argument that their subjective epistemic moral intentionality could plausibly be influenced and warped by phenomenological emotive reference points—However, they could resist and stand firm, insisting that morality is stance independent—non-subjective and therefore emotive factors wouldn’t alter the moral reality of detached objective values.
2.10: Divine Expressionism
As highlighted above, this leads to an interesting and unexpected theistic spin on traditional secular emotivism. Whilst emotivism is non-cognitive—subjective and relative, when emotivism is applied to the theistic moral realist paradigm, all error, arbitrary and subjective factors are unlocked and the emotive master key falls into its rightful place.
2.11: The Euthyphro Dilemma
This is best explained by revisiting the Euthyphro dilemma which can be formulated as follow:
“Is something good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good?”
In other words, if God wills it because it is good—then goodness is a measurement external to God. If it is good because God wills it then goodness is arbitrary—heinous actions could have been willed as good. The traditional answer is that something is good because of God’s omnibenevolent nature. This abstract theological answer remains unconvincing to the atheist or agnostic as it appeals to an inward theistic paradigm, providing what’s considered as a circular answer.
This circular critique and the dilemma itself is directly addressed and resolved by appealing to the emotivist linguistic toolset.
2.12: Perfect Expressionism
God’s emotive expressions are not arbitrary, internalist, or externalist emotional constraints. As traditionally conceived and in emotivist language, God’s emotions flow directly from His omni-nature—His omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence set the intrinsic standard.
Therefore, goodness is identical to God’s nature; not because of any arbitrary divine choice or because it is an abstract entity mirrored external to Him. Goodness–is simply God’s nature expressed emotively. This avoids the dilemma by collapsing the two horns into one unified reality. Goodness is not independent and external to God and neither is it arbitrary as it flows necessarily and directly from His perfect, eternal, and immutable intentional nature. In summary, God doesn’t choose what is good, His emotive perfection is the good and this goodness is God’s own nature emotively manifest.
This is the traditional theistic apologetic response that avoids both horns of the Euthyphro dilemma. The usual pushback is to reassert the issue and claim that the theist hasn’t answered coherently and is missing the point of the objection. This might normally have some plausible deniability and contention.
However, this uniquely formulated emotivist response focuses on augmenting the already established emotivist framework. Thus when emotivism is robustly integrated with theistic attributes, it is naturally elevated from the naturalistic flawed and subjective, relative, unstable and arbitrary secular version of emotivism to an enhanced flawless theistic standard.
Consequently ‘Divine Expressionism’ emerges naturally as a coherent moral realism—a realism universally and ontologically grounded in God’s perfected necessary and non-contingent nature. This solves the instability of emotivism and the Euthyphro dilemma, killing two birds with one stone and furthermore, most importantly and absolutely crucial to take note of—theism explains emotive normativity better than any atheism and agnostic account.
3: The Beatific Vision
This is analogous to the beatific vision and demonstrates that normative objections, such as the problem of evil and its variants are really questions of an incomplete epistemology—invoking skeptical theism. Paraphrasing Emerson, the suffering of victims can be squared if the victims themselves come to know and approve of the reason for their suffering. With this proposed conditional solution it would thus seem that the primary concern of intrinsic impermissibles are first and foremost an epistemic and emotive issue.
It is true that none of us can indubitably prove or disprove the existence of the monotheistic deity or even a pantheon of polytheistic demigods. But if any such supernatural entities exist, once they are encountered, either directly or indirectly, their existential fact remains open to doubt and question.
Most importantly however, I believe it remains the case, that if and only if a deity with traditional omni-powers exists—it is the only entity with the ways and means to rationally convince any contingent agent of its necessary existence but additionally possesses emotive mastery, and is always open to meet and induce the agent with volitional belief—overriding all prior reservations, rational, intellectual, and emotional—no matter how doubtful and no matter how strong any prior convictions may have originally seemed.
3.1: Theistic Narratives of Existential Suffering
With my main focal counter-argument articulated. I’ll attempt to directly address Emerson’s assertive implications. His subtlety supported argumentation accuses theism and informally its adherents of disregarding the sacredness of life. This seems to be a hasty generalisation of theistic apologetic discourse and conduct and might be considered as a general ad hominem aimed at theists and not theism itself.
This rhetorically and emotively charged accusation is illustrated with the gratuitous suffering of the deer in the forest fire and the last moments of a child suffocating and/or overwhelmed in harrowing flames. Emerson personally believes that for him to become a theist this would involve the acceptance of a theistic normative fact or intuition that these intrinsic impermissibles are de-facto—actually permissible for one reason or another, with or without knowledge of the fact. He further explains this hypothetical acceptance as a betrayal to all victims of intrinsic impermissibles.
This personal conclusion aims to demonstrate that theistic worldviews provide insufficient and incoherent narratives to epistemically explain the gratuitous suffering of intrinsic impermissibles. This is a personal preference that tarnishes all theistic belief systems with the same broad brush. This seems to be a mistake as different belief systems have different ways of accounting for the sacredness of human suffering. I will focus on just two examples that bring this claim into dispute.
3.2: The Aztecs
While a full anthropological investigation of the Aztec belief system isn’t necessary to make my point, it will suffice to mention their belief relating to human sacrifice. I will aim to be concise.
The Aztecs believed in a creation narrative of several Gods which sacrificed themselves for the creation of the world. This plurality of Gods were united in an impersonal divine essence. The purest physical manifestation of this essence was contained in human blood. It was obligatory for the Aztecs to imitate and impersonate the sacrifice of their Gods with mass organised ritual sacrifice. They believed this obligation was a sacred and necessary duty in order to keep the cosmos in perpetual order, assuring that the sun would arise and the crops would continue to grow etc.
This may seem to devalue life and appear barbaric and ignorant to us self-professed modern civilised people, but the Aztec reverence for human blood priced it as the most valuable substance in all existence. As necessary as the divine essence acting as a transmutational vehicle with the unique utility of maintaining cosmic order.
Contrary to popular portrayal, the Aztecs were a highly civilised and technologically advanced society for their time, location, and needs. They had laws and legal systems and were agriculturally advanced with extensive cosmological knowledge as well as having creation myths.
They had a just system of war. When the Aztecs went to battle amongst themselves, the aim was not to kill the enemy but to subdue and ritually sacrifice them to the Gods. This was a great honor not just bestowed to some of their terrified and ignorant out-group victims, but to members of their own civilisation that would willingly volunteer to be sacrificed. Sacrifice meant an eternity in paradise. Thus, taking into account all the above it is reasonable to conclude that ritual sacrifice was the very cornerstone of their civilisation. This brings me to what I think is an interesting point.
3.3: The Normative Cosmic Prohibition Against Murder
Having elaborated on the Aztecs profound respect for human life and touching on their theology of ritual sacrifice. I find it necessary to comment on how this may have affected their prohibition against murder.
We like to think our modern civilised sentiments and wealth of knowledge provide us with many reasons to refrain from committing murder. For the sake of brevity I shall not list any laws or metaethical theories that explicate and justify the prohibition of this distinct human act. However, I will argue that the value of human life and the prohibition against murder amongst the Aztecs likely had greater normative force then any of our relative modern day approaches. For the following reasons:
- The murder victim was denied the potential to be sacrificed to the Gods.
- The denial of this potential does not merely involve personal implications but challenges the cosmic order.
- Therefore, for the Aztecs, murder didn’t just disturb the social order but could potentially have catastrophic cosmic repercussions.
Whether the Aztec theocratic theistic system was true, right or wrong is irrelevant to the case I’m making. What I’m suggesting is that the Aztecs placed a higher normative value judgement on human life. Their prohibition against murder had a powerful and sacred normativity behind its binding force. This prohibition likely had greater organisational behavioral emotive enforcement than our modern secular institutional and metaethical equivalents. This example directly challenges the idea that theism trivialises the sacredness of human life.
3.4: Theistic Narratives of Existential Suffering: Conclusion
This counter-argument logically exposes Emerson’s narrow and normative claim that theism and by extension all theistic belief systems broadly require the approved justification and comfortable acceptance of intrinsic impermissibles. I’ve sufficiently demonstrated in the opening introduction and articulated in section 1.3 and 1.5 that the ontology of intrinsic impermissibles is nebulous. This is why openly declaring or attempting to ontologically ground the metaethical position may have strengthened the argument.
Because of this metaethical uncertainty and ambiguity, it is a valid critique of mine to assert that Emerson’s evaluative normative critique of theism doesn’t seem to arise from an idealised, actual, or neutral unbiased position. I can agree that it is the case that such incendiary and flammable examples of suffering do cause a common and intersubjective natural emotive and empathetic revulsion of intuitive injustice. But this sensitivity can be attributed to biological and social evolutionary psychological factors—which may or may not be grounded in an objective moral realism.
As such, all these factors form a broad naturalistic paradigm which can alternatively be interpreted and rooted in the moral expressions of the modern zeitgeist and its sensibilities. Contemporary social evolutionary intuitions which aren’t universally shared across time and therefore cannot invalidate theistic systems simply because they don’t mirror-match those sensibilities.
The Aztecs might view such impermissibles as symptomatic occurrence of cosmic disorder. In other words, more blood for the blood God would be the rallying cry needed to rectify the cosmic order and prevent future unfortunate impermissibles. This implies a recognition but not an incoherent acceptance.
Similarly, Christian tradition includes centuries of thinkers which have wrestled and systematically attempted to reconcile with Christian theology the Euthyphro dilemma—otherwise known as the problem of evil. With theological pillars such as Augustine and Aquinas and contemporary figures such as John Hick and Alvin Plantinga and many more. Each in their own way has built upon and further developed fair and critically formulated sophisticated theodicies. All of which do not attempt to trivialise and dismiss pain and suffering but to provide plausible conditions for its existence.
The common doctrinal Christian position of agreement, might be to highlight the volitional death of Jesus’s sacrifice on the cross. Amongst a variety of theological interpretations this is seen as a moment of solidarity and unification between God and man—a cosmic moment of reconciliation which understandably would include divine acknowledgement and acceptance of the heavily laden incumbent responsibility and transactional value of the irredeemable intrinsic impermissibles. This may be unsatisfactory to some but nevertheless is a coherent narrative which doesn’t trivialise or deny the weight of intrinsic impermissibles.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Emerson’s eloquent and emotionally persuasive essay is emotively and rhetorically charged. It has a wide general appeal which intuitively pulls on the heart strings. These emotive appeals, no matter how sincere or accurate they might be, are not enough to invalidate theism. The thrust of the essay is the claim that theism necessarily requires normative evaluative claims. I cannot think of a reason why this isn’t the case; however, the further implied entailment is that the acceptance of theism must necessarily comfortably include the acceptance of ‘intrinsic impermissibles’ and this claim evidently seems a personal bridge too far.
There are several reasons for rejecting this claim. First, it paints all systems of theism with the same broad and negative brush. When in fact theistic belief systems have a deeply profound respect and sacred reverence for human life. This point was articulated with the investigation of Aztec civilization and arguably their superior normative force behind the moral prohibition of murder. This was demonstrated further to the extent that theologians have historically struggled to reconcile gratuitous suffering with an omnibenevolent deity. These theologians evidently were theists—and so we can conclude from this fact that theists can align their faith and live in a world permeated with intrinsic impermissibles.
By Invoking sceptical theism we can further conclude that theism doesn’t require the approved justification and acceptance of gratuitous suffering. The theist can strongly disagree with the existence of such suffering and surrender the idea that they will ever fully reconcile it with their faith and intellectually understand its purpose.
This position is assumed to entail the acceptance of the phenomena and attributing it to a divine purpose which only God knows. However, I don’t see any issue with a theist remaining agnostic in their approach to skeptical theism. Perhaps there is a purpose, perhaps there isn’t—is there a contradiction in regarding the issue as an unknowable struggle of doubt and cognitive dissonance? I don’t think it is the case that there would be any contradiction in that stance.
Setting all these reasonable objections aside and graciously granting the critique the force and attention it deserves, I’ve presented the case that intrinsic impermissibles lack an adequate and straightforward ontological grounding. I think Emerson could have attempted to provide this with his critique. Even if it meant accounting for the multiple different metaethical theories I suggested. This could have made it easier to better understand his criticism and accept or attack his metaethical epistemology.
Nevertheless, without ontology intrinsic impermissibles serve as an emotive rescue device. Helping to emotionally support and thereby cling to one’s validated agnosticism or atheism. However it is that one chooses to ground gratuitous suffering. With the development of the EMO argument, I’ve attacked this thesis and I believe demonstrated that even if such metaethical and emotive arguments are truly valid they are ultimately unsound and fall short of invalidating theism.
To reiterate the EMO argument in summary. Introduces the notion of an agent with emotive mastery within the emotivist paradigm. Such an agent becomes an arbitrative legislator of emotivist normativity. This argument was concluded as logically valid and sound. As a thought experiment the EMO argument completely dismantled secular emotivism; whilst additionally partially challenging moral realism— essentially giving us reason to doubt our common intersubjective emotional intuitions. Blurring access to any suppositional atheistic objective realm.
The EMO argument led to the development of Divine Expressionism. This is best described as a theistic framework of moral realism. This theistic metaethical theory made use of Emotivism’s philosophical language and theory to structure a theistic emotivism. Divine Expressionism is reinforced and without all the flaws revealed in my critique of its secular sibling. Additionally it provides the conceptual language to justify its immunity to the critique of the Euthyphro dilemma.
Something isn’t good because God wills it because it is good— neither is something good because God wills it so. Divine Expressionism avoids this classical dilemma because something is good not because God wills it so, or because there is an independent standard measurement of goodness for God to appeal. God doesn’t choose what is good, His emotive perfection is the good and this goodness is God’s own nature emotively manifest, hence—Divine Expressionism.
It therefore follows, that even if we grant the entirety of Emerson’s critique without pushback or fight, if Divine Expressionism is plausibly true, and if the Omni-Deity plausibly does exist–the emotive evaluative notion of the necessary acceptance of intrinsic impermissibles perishes. The Emotive Mastery of such a deity could, if needed, volitionally remove such an insurmountable object from disrupting anyone’s faith.